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Introduction
Midterm elections are elections in which the American electorate votes for all seats of the
United States House of Representatives, approximately one-third of the seats in the United States
Senate, and a majority of state governorships and state legislatures. Many political scientists and
pundits regard midterm elections as a referendum on the incumbent president, as these elections
occur midway through the four-year term. Since 1860, the beginning of the modern two-political
party system, the party occupying the White House loses seats in the Congress, with the
exception of three elections.1 Unfortunately, many scholars neglect the importance of midterm
elections. In fact, Andrew W. Busch (1999), author of the book Horses in Midstream: U. S.
Midterm Elections and Their Consequences, 1894 – 1998, described midterm elections as “the
poor stepchild of American electoral studies in most respects” (1).
Conventional analysis of midterm elections is usually in relation to the previous
presidential election, or the issues or events leading up towards a presidential election. Rarely is
midterm elections considered in terms of whether the president, or his party in some cases,
would retain the White House in the next presidential election. The focus of this research is to
determine whether midterm elections can serve as a predictive indicator of the outcome in the
following presidential election. For decades, scholars have speculated as to why the president’s
party suffers losses at the midterm election. An examination of these theories can provide insight
into the variables that should be considered when examining the central question of this research.
Competing Theories of Midterm Elections
Coattails and Surge-and-Decline
1

The three exceptions are the midterm elections of 1934, 1938, and 2002, where the incumbent party gained nine,
four, and eight seats respectively in the U.S. House of Representatives. There is a fourth election, the midterm
election of 1902, in which the incumbent Republican party gained nine seats. However, this gain is sixteen seats
short of the twenty-five seats the Democrats gained, following the increase in the number of representatives
following the 1900 census.
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When it comes to midterm elections, there exist two prominent theories that help explain
why the president’s party suffers losses. The first theory is the “coattails theory.” According to
this theory, first proposed by Louis Bean (1948), the losses suffered by the president’s party are a
result of the decline in voter turnout for midterm elections. The voters that voted in the
presidential election because of a specific candidate are less likely to vote in the off-year
election; thus, congressional candidates from the president’s party are likely to suffer defeat in
the absence of presidential coattails (Press 1956, 691).
Building on the coattails theory is the “surge and decline theory.” According to Angus
Campbell (1960), who first proposed his theory, a high-stimulus election (an election in which
issues, events, and/or popular candidates may stimulate widespread enthusiasm and interest
amongst the electorate) is usually followed by a low-stimulus election (elections in which issues
or events do not stimulate interest and enthusiasm amongst the electorate for the election). If
there is enough interest, in any given election, voters who may not usually vote (or voters with
weak party identification) tend to vote for one party over the other. However, if the election does
not seem to be important enough, only the typical, dedicated voters will vote (Campbell 1960,
398-401). Displayed in Figure 1, on the following page, are the major premises of Campbell’s
theory.
In order to prove his theory, Campbell focused on patterns and trends in voter turnout and
partisanship. Campbell (1960) referred to two panel studies, conducted by the Survey Research
Center, the first of which was a study of the presidential election in 1952 asking participants (1)
their choice in the election, and, (2) whom they voted for in the previous election. In 1956 and
1958, the Survey Research Center conducted a second survey, asking the participants about their
vote choice in both elections. These two national surveys revealed three interesting findings.
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First, Campbell (1960) classifies the 1952 presidential election as a surge election, due to an
increase in voter turnout and a swing in partisanship that resulted in Eisenhower receiving more
votes than Thomas Dewey. Second, Campbell classified the 1956-58 election cycles as an
electoral decline, due to less political party activity and media coverage than in typical
presidential elections. In addition, he notes a major swing in partisanship in favor of Democrats,
as opposed to the swing from 1952 (Campbell 1960, 399-402).

Figure 1: The Theory of Surge and Decline’s Sequence
The Presidential-Election Surge

The Midterm-Election Decline

High level of information and
turnout

Low level of information and
turnout

Short-term forces favor the party
winning the presidency

No systematic tilt of short-term
forces

Core voters
Partisanship: High
Turnout: Yes
Vote choice: Some defection
to winning presidential party

Core voters
Partisanship: High
Turnout: Yes
Vote choice: Vote for their
party

Peripheral voters
Partisanship: Low
Turnout: Yes
Vote choice: Large vote for
the winning presidential
party

Peripheral voters:
Partisanship: Low
Turnout: No
Vote choice: N/A

(Campbell 1997, 14)
Vote gains for congressional
candidates of the party winning
the presidency

Vote losses for congressional
candidates of the president’s
party
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Referendum Theory
Edward R. Tufte (1975) posits the other major theory that attempts to explain why the
president’s party suffers midterm congressional losses. In response to the original surge and
decline theory, Tufte tries to explain why it is the case the president’s party loses the number of
seats as it does (1975, 813). Whereas surge-and-decline is focused mainly on voter turnout and
the amount of interest and information that is present in the election, Tufte focuses on two
additional, yet equally important, factors: presidential popularity (Kernell 1977; Piereson 1975;
Tufte 1975, 813) and national economic performance (Kramer 1971; Stigler 1973; Tufte 1975,
814). The reconstruction of Tufte’s model is below, labeled as Figure 2.

Public approval of
President at time of
midterm election

Figure 2: Tufte’s Referendum
Model

Pre-election shifts in
economic conditions

Magnitude of national vote
loss by President’s party

Magnitude of congressional
seat loss by President’s party
(Tufte 1975, 814)

Using data from 1938 to 1970, Tufte examines his hypothesis through multiple regression
analysis, using the following equation (Tufte 1975, 817):
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Based on his findings, Tufte concluded that all of the midterm elections of 1938-1970
were in fact a referendum on the president based on his performance and the management of the
national economy (1975, 824). Tufte based this argument on his finding that the two independent
variables—the president’s approval rating and the yearly change in real disposable personal
income per capita—explained approximately 91% of the variation in midterm election results.
According to Tufte, a 10% change in the president’s Gallup approval rating equates to a 1.3
percentage point change in the national midterm congressional vote of the president’s party.
Tufte also found that a change of $100 in real disposable income in the year prior to the election
equated to a 3.5 percentage points change in the national midterm congressional vote of the
president’s party (1975, 817).
Tufte followed-up on his research in his 1978 book, Political Control of the Economy.
Here, Tufte shifted the period he was studying; now, Tufte started with the 1946 midterm
election and concluded with the 1974 midterm election. Now, a 1 percentage point change in the
growth of real disposable income per capita the year prior to the election equates to a 0.6
percentage point change in the president’s party’s national congressional vote. Also, a 10
percentage point change in the president’s Gallup approval poll equates to a 1.3 percentage point
change in the president’s party’s national congressional vote, the same as when Tufte conducted
this research in 1975 (1978, 110-2). Tufte’s results led to a shift in scholars’ consideration of
how the president’s party loses midterm congressional races. This shift in focus to referendumtype voting deflated the importance of the surge-and-decline theory.
A Proliferation of Theory
Tufte’s research paved the way for more analysis regarding the subject of midterm losses
for the president’s party. In 1981, Jacobson and Kernell proposed the strategic politicians’
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theory. Here, Jacobson and Kernell argue that the decisions of politicians regarding whether they
will seek office, or how they run their campaign, are factors in voters’ minds come Election Day.
In 1984, Lewis-Black and Rice proposed a referendum theory similar to Tufte’s, except instead
of using disposable income as the economic measure, they used the growth rate of the Gross
National Product (GNP) six-nine months prior to the election. However, critics of their model
argue that GNP is not an accurate indicator. In 1991, the Bureau of Labor Statistics switched
from using GNP to using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) because GDP refers to production
taking place inside the U.S. (Department of Commerce 1991, 8).
Abramowitz, Cover, and Norpoth (1986) reconstructed Tufte’s original referendum
model, including an additional variable (party competence evaluations), in order to explain why
the president’s party does considerably worst in subsequent midterm elections, as compared to
the party’s first midterm election. Abramowitz, Cover, and Norpoth concluded that because the
electorate had a more favorable view of the opposing party regarding fixing the nation’s party
over the incumbent party in subsequent midterm elections, the incumbent party will suffer
greater losses in subsequent midterm elections than in the first midterm election (1986, 574).
Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman (1986) also proposed a new theory, exposure theory,
which is supposed to be highly predictive of turnovers in U.S. House elections (Oppenheimer,
Stimson, and Waterman 1986, 227). The authors measured exposure as “the excess or deficit
number of seats a party holds measured against its long-term norm,” (1986, 228). However,
Gaddie (1997) proposed an alternative to the exposure theory, focusing more on open-seat
exposure; he calculated this type of exposure as the “net number of open seats the president's
party has exposed (Open Seatspres - Open Seatsout),” (Gaddie 1997, 706). Erikson (1988) argued
that the reason the president’s party suffers midterm losses are simply that it is the party
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currently in control, a restoration of Kernell’s negative-voting theory (1977). Erikson also
posited the argument that economic conditions did not matter when determining midterm
elections (1990). However, Jacobson (1990) refuted this conclusion in an article published in
response to Erikson.
Restoration and Revision of Surge-and-Decline
In the late 1980s, there was an attempt to resurrect the surge and decline theory. James E.
Campbell issued a revised version in 1987 and refined the model in 1991, and refined the model
once more in 1997. According to Campbell (1987, 968), the difference between his theory and
Angus Campbell’s (1960) original theory is that, unlike the original theory, turnout of peripheral
partisans and the voting choice of independents will be affected due to a surge in both interest
and information. Listed below in Figure 3 is a summary of the differences between the two
theories (Campbell 1987, 969).

Figure 3: A Comparison of the
Original and Revised Theories
of Surge and Decline in
Congressional Elections
Voters

Effects of
Short-Term
Presidential
Election
Forces

Turnout
Effect

Vote Choice
Effect

Independents

Partisans

Original
Theory
(A. Campbell)

Revised
Theory
(J. Campbell)

Revised
Theory
(J. Campbell)

Original
Theory
(A. Campbell)

(Campbell 1987, 969)
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Campbell’s revised theory makes the claim that the number of partisans present in the
electorate for the presidential election and a presidential candidate’s share of the independent
vote is directly proportional to the magnitude of the short-term forces that favors the president’s
party (1987, 970). James E. Campbell utilizes linear regression analysis to prove his theory,
examining the relationship between congressional vote choice and party identification, turnout,
and the president’s share of the popular vote in the previous midterm election between the years
1956 and 1982 (1987, 970-1)
Campbell (1987) concluded that there was a surge effect in the number of partisan voters
that turned out and a surge effect for information present during the presidential election; these
surge effects are not present in midterm elections (977-8). In 1991, Campbell issued a revision to
his version of the surge-and-decline. This time, Campbell expanded his time series to examine 31
presidential elections and 30 midterm elections between the years 1868 and 1988 (1991). For the
purposes of this revision, Campbell looked at the relationship between electoral change and the
president’s popular vote share, controlling for a number of factors, including whether the
election year was a presidential year or a midterm year (1991, 478-81). Campbell concluded that
although his findings weakened over a large period, surge-and-decline effects were still present,
(1991, 484-5).
Campbell’s (1997) outlines his completed revision of surge-and-decline in his book, The
Presidential Pulse of Congressional Elections. The major elements of Campbell’s revised theory
are below, outlined in Figure 4. Campbell (1997) explains that his theory, unlike the original
surge-and-decline theory, takes into account Tufte’s idea that the midterm election acts as a
referendum on the president’s party (109). Campbell’s revised theory also takes into account
Kernell and Jacobson’s theory of the strategic politician. Campbell (1997) concludes that the
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short-term forces affecting the presidential election, other than affecting the decisions of the
electorate, has the potential for affecting congressional candidates decisions. This includes
whether an incumbent decides to seek reelection or retire, whether a challenger decides to
declare their candidacy, or if a party decides to run a candidate at all (115).

Figure 4: The Revised Theory of Surge-and-Decline’s Sequence
The Presidential-Election Surge

The Midterm-Election Decline

High level of information and
turnout

Low level of information and
turnout

Short-term forces favor the party
winning the presidency

No systematic tilt of short-term
forces

Advantaged partisans (the
winning presidential party)
Turnout: higher than usual
because of their popular
presidential candidate

Advantaged partisans (the
president’s party)
Turnout: normal rate

Disadvantaged partisans (the
losing presidential party)
Turnout: lower than usual
because of cross-pressures

Disadvantaged partisans (the outparty)
Turnout: normal rate

Independents
Vote choice: splits in favor
of the winning presidential
party

Independents
Vote choice: no systematic tilt
toward either tilt
(Campbell 1997, 107)

Vote gains for congressional
candidates of the party winning
the presidency

Vote losses for congressional
candidates of the president’s
party
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Using Midterm Elections Theories to Predict Subsequent Presidential Elections
Although these two schools of thought attempt to explain why the president would suffer
losses in the midterm election following his own election, scholars have yet to apply these
theories to the question of whether midterm elections could be a predictive indicator of
subsequent presidential elections. Voter turnout and enthusiasm, presidential performance,
economic performance, and all of the other variables that comprise these two theories are not
only important in terms of the first two years of the President’s term in office; they also factor
greatly in the second half of the term as well. Thus, there is a clear causal link between midterm
and presidential elections.
However, it is likely that any causal relationship between midterm elections and
subsequent presidential elections is less clear, because there are so many factors that affect the
outcome of presidential elections. These factors include, but are not limited to, policy issues,
candidate favorability, and political ideology. When it comes to predicting presidential elections,
there is a consensus among scholars that there are two main factors to consider at the time of the
election: the popularity of the incumbent president, and the state of the economy. In regards to
the economy, Fair (1978) concluded that the economy, in terms of real economic activity (i.e.
change in Gross National Product or change in the unemployment rate) affects the voting on
presidential elections (171). A similar finding came from Erikson (1989), although his measure
of economic activity was per capita disposable income (568).
In regards to presidential popularity, some scholars have argued that the incumbent
president’s approval rating had nothing to do with his reelection chances (Mueller 1973, 197202). Others have disagreed by showing evidence of a positive correlation between the
president’s approval rating in the last poll prior to the election and the actual vote share the
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president received (Sigelman 1979, 533). Scholars have also incorporated presidential popularity
to predict the vote share of the presidential candidate of the incumbent party, who is not the
incumbent president himself (Brody and Sigelman 1983, 328). Thus, presidential popularity and
the economy are common variables to predict the president’s, and his party’s, chances of
retaining the White House. Thus, most scholars use the Tufte model, focusing on presidential
popularity and the state of the economy, when creating their own presidential models. The only
difference is that whereas Tufte uses real disposable income per capita as the economic indicator,
presidential election models use GNP (Lewis-Beck and Rice 1984, Abramowitz 1988), Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), inflation (Moghaddam and Elich 2009, 460-1), or any combination of
these three variables to represent the state of the economy.
Two important questions create the focus of this paper. The first question is the theories
used to explain midterm election results applicable to predicting subsequent presidential
elections. If it is the case that these theories are applicable to predicting subsequent presidential
elections, then the second question is which theory, surge-and-decline or referendum, is the most
applicable for predicting subsequent presidential elections. It is my contention that midterm
election theories are applicable to predicting subsequent presidential elections, and that Tufte’s
referendum model, or a variation of it, is the most applicable for predicting subsequent
presidential elections.
Data and Methodology
In order to test my theory and hypothesis, I estimate three models. The first two models
approximate the midterm surge-and-decline and referendum theories. The third model is a test of
my own theory, that the results of the previous midterm elections influence subsequent
presidential elections.
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Data from sixteen presidential and midterm elections (1948 to 2010) comprises the
research. The data does not expand to pre-1948 due to the limited availability of certain
variables. For example, the Bureau of Economic Analysis only has quarterly data regarding
personal disposable income as far back as 1947, and Gallup has data on its presidential job
approval poll as far back as 1937. However, despite these data constraints, having sixteen data
points to work with is crucial in designing an accurate model for predicting either future midterm
or presidential election results.
The first variable of interest is the number of House seats lost or gained by the
President’s party in each election, calculated as the difference between the number of seats held
or won during one election, and the number of seats held or won during the next election
(HouseSeatGain). Out of the 32 election years examined, House seat gains and losses range from
a loss of 63 seats in 2010 to a gain of 75 seats in 1948. This variable will serve as the dependent
variable for the midterm election models, and as the main independent variable for my
presidential election model.
The second variable, PresReelect, is simply whether or not the President was re-elected
(or his party retained control of the White House). This binary variable serves as the dependent
variable in the presidential election model; it is coded zero (0) for instances in which the
President lost his reelection bid (or his party lost control of the White House) and one (1) for
instances in which the President was successfully reelected (or his party successfully retained
control of the White House). Out of the 16 presidential election years covered, there are eight
instances where the President won reelection, or his party maintained control of the White
House, and eight instances where the President lost reelection, or his party lost control of the
White House.
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In order to measure the direction and magnitude of the presidential “surge” (Campbell
1987, 971), I use PresVote, the share of the popular vote received by the winning candidate in
each presidential election. It is also the independent variable of primary focus to surge and
decline supporters (Campbell 1985, 1144). Over the course of the past 16 presidential elections,
the President’s share of the popular vote ranged from 43% in 1992 to 61.10% in 1964. I also
estimated an alternative measure that accounts for the magnitude of PresVote. Instead of looking
at just the president’s share of the popular vote in the presidential election, there is also the
question of how much the president’s share of the popular vote either exceeds, or falls short, of
the fifty percent benchmark. This variable, MagPresVote, is measured as fifty percent subtracted
from the president’s percentage share of the popular vote (Campbell 1991, 479).
Another variable measured is PresApproval, the President’s approval rating prior to each
election. This data comes from Gallup, with the last poll taken prior to the election ranging from
September to October2, with the President’s approval rating, over the course of this data series,
range from 25% in 2008 to 74% in 1964.
I examine two variables that measure economic health. The first, PctChangInc, is the
percent change in total disposable income per capita (adjusted for inflation), calculated from
Bureau of Economic Analysis data. Whereas Tufte’s original model utilized the percent change
in total disposable income for the year prior to the election, this research utilizes the percent
change in total disposable income for the year the election occurred. The reason for this is the
election year’s percent change in disposable income is a more contemporary measure to use

2

It is worth noting that a presidential approval rating was not included for 1936 because the Gallup presidential
approval poll did not begin until late 1937. In addition, the presidential approval rating for 1944 is not from Gallup,
it is from an Office of Public Opinion and Research (OPOR) poll taken in August 1944. The presidential approval
rating listed for 1948 is from a Gallup poll, but the poll in question came from the period of June 18-24.
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instead of the percent change from the previous year. The percent change of total disposable
income during election years range from -2.6% in 1980 to 7.5% in 1950.
The second income variable examined is PctChangInc3rd. Instead of examining the
yearly percent change in total disposable income, this variable represents the percent change of
the third quarter results of total disposable income. This figure covers the months of July,
August, and September, and provides more of an accurate depiction of voters’ “pocketbooks”
heading into the final month of the election (Jacobson and Kernell 1983, 67). The third quarter
percent change of total disposable income during election years range from -3.0% in 1980 to
8.7% in 1950.
Two more variables I examined reflected the party identification of the voting electorate
since 1952. PartyIDD and PartyIDR represent the percentages of respondents considering
themselves Democrats and Republicans, respectively, on a three-point scale. This data comes
from the American National Elections Studies (ANES) time series surveys from 1952 to 2008.3
These two variables are included in the surge-and-decline model, to represent Campbell’s (1997)
idea of advantaged and disadvantaged partisans (99-104). During election years, those
classifying themselves as Democrats range from 47% in 1994 to 62% in 1964. Those classifying
themselves as Republicans range from 30% in 1978 to 43% in 2002.
Another variable I examined is ConsumerConf, which measures how confident
consumers are about the state of the current economy, via the current index, with the index
normalized to have a value of 100 in December 1964. The data representing this variable covers

3

Because there was no time series surveys conducted in 2006 and 2010, the numbers from 2004 and 2008 are used
to represent their respective following election years.
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years 1951 to 2010, with an election low of 70.4 in 1952, to an election high of 113.0 in 1998.4
This variable is included in the referendum model, to represent voters’ ideas about the economy.
The final variable I include is CongApproval, representing the Congress’s job approval
from 1974 to 2010. For the purposes of this research, I used the last poll taken prior to the
election, ranging from an election low of 17% in 2010 to an election high of 50% in 2002. This
variable is exclusive to the presidential election model only.
I also include a dummy variable representing the president’s political party. A “0”
represents the Republican Party, and a “1” represents the Democratic Party.
For the purposes of this research, I will construct a model to show that midterm elections
are a predictive indicator for presidential elections. The model, in its most basic form, resembles
Figure 5, located on the next page.
This model illustrates the question: which of the two theories, surge and decline or
referenda, is a better predictive model for midterm elections? Can midterm election results
represent an indicator in predicting the president’s reelection chances? The hypothesis born from
this model is that the results of a midterm election, in conjunction with intervening factor(s), can
serve as a predictive gauge as to whether the incumbent President will win re-election.
I incorporated Regression analysis to examine the relationships between these variables.
Linear regression is used to examine the relationship between House gains/losses and the
president’s popular vote percentage, President’s approval rating prior to the midterm, and percent
change in total disposable income. Logistic regression is used to examine the relationship
between whether or not the President is re-elected and the results of the previous midterm

4

For years 1951-59, the most recent index number prior to the election is used. From 1960 onwards, the average of
the July, August, and September indices is used.
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election. Table 1 outlines the different models analyzed, the variables included, and the type of
regression applied to each model.
President’s
Share of
Popular Vote

Figure 5
Presidential
Approval
Rating

Yearly Change in
Total Disposable
Income

Presidential
Election (t)

Midterm
Election
(t+2)

Presidential
Election
(t+4)

Additionally, I provide three correlation matrices for key variables, one for each model
(see Appendix A). The purpose of these matrices is to see whether there are relationships
between the key variables in the model(s), and will these relationships hold true in the regression
analysis.
Table 1 – Midterm and Presidential Election Models
Models
Midterm – Surgeand-Decline

Dependent
Variable
HouseSeatGain

Midterm –
Referendum

HouseSeatGain

Presidential

PresReelect

Independent
Controls
Variable
PresVote
Party
(MagPresVote)
PartyIDD,
PartyIDR
PresApproval,
Party
PctChangInc
(PctChangInc3rd)
ConsumerConf
HouseSeatGain,? PresSeekReelect,

Type of
Regression
Linear

Linear

Logit
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Results
Surge-and-Decline Model
This model looks at the relationship between the number of House Seats gained or lost by
the president’s party at the midterm election and the president’s share of the popular vote from
the previous presidential election.
Looking at the correlation matrix for this model, the matrix reveals that the relationship
between HouseSeatGain and PresVote shows a Pearson correlation value of -0.390, and a pvalue of 0.099. The relationship between HouseSeatGain and MagPresVote shows a Pearson
correlation value of -0.400, and a p-value of 0.090. The matrix also reveals that the relationship
between PartyIDR and PresVote shows a Pearson correlation value of -0.444, and a p-value of
0.098. The relationship between PartyIDR and MagPresVote shows a Pearson correlation value
of -0.447, and a p-value of 0.095. Although none of the p-values in the correlations fall below
0.05, it will be interesting in seeing whether these relationships will translate into causal
relationships in the regression tests.
Based on the results from the correlations, I conducted eight tests of this model, with
each test only looking at the midterm election years; resulting in nineteen midterm elections
examined (fifteen when PartyIDD and PartyIDR included). The results of the eight tests show
that PartyIDD and PartyIDR had no statistical effect on the number of House seats the
president’s party lose (or gain) in the midterm election. The tests that appeared to be the best
representatives of the surge-and-decline model are the tests in which the independent variables
are either PresVote or MagPresVote, and Party. When the model consists of the variables
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PresVote and Party, the model has an adjusted R square value of 0.231, with a p-value of 0.048.
PresVote has a coefficient value of -185.533, a standardized coefficient value of-0.420, and a pvalue of 0.060. Party has a coefficient value of -18.854, a standardized coefficient value of 0.407, and a p-value of 0.067. For this test, the model explains about 23 percent of the variance
in the results of U.S. House races during the midterm elections. Regarding the variable PresVote,
its coefficient shows that the better the president performs in his election, the worse his party will
perform in the midterm elections in the following midterm election.
When the model consists of the variables MagPresVote and Party, the model has an
adjusted R square value of 0.237, with a p-value of 0.045. MagPresVote has a coefficient value
of -188.345, a standardized coefficient value of-0.425, and a p-value of 0.056. Party has a
coefficient value of -18.688, a standardized coefficient value of -0.403, with a p-value of 0.069.
For this test, the model explains about 23-24 percent of the variance in the results of U.S. House
races during the midterm elections. Regarding the variable MagPresVote, its coefficient shows
that the better the president performs in his election, the worse his party will perform in the
midterm elections in the following midterm election. In fact, the president’s party will perform
worse under this model than the previous model with PresVote. Because of the similarities
between the results of the two models, it is best to run the presidential model incorporating
PresVote instead of MagPresVote (see Appendix B for the full results of this, and the referendum
model).
Referendum Model
The next model I tested evaluated Tufte’s referendum model, looking at the president’s
approval rating and the percent change in total disposable income, both yearly and third quarter.
I conducted eight tests of this model, with each test only looking at the midterm election years;
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resulting in nineteen midterm elections examined (sixteen when PctChangInc3rd replaces
PctChangInc; fifteen when ConsumerConf is included).
Looking at the correlation matrix for this model, there are three relationships whose pvalues are 0.05 or below. The first significant relationship that appears is the relationship
between HouseSeatGain and PresApproval. This relationship has a Pearson correlation value of
0.506, and a p-value of 0.027. Another significant relationship that appears is the relationship
between Party and PcyChangInc3rd. This relationship has a Pearson correlation value of 0.639,
and a p-value of 0.008. The third and final significant relationship in this matrix is the
relationship between ConsumerConf and PctChangInc. This relationship has a Pearson
correlation value of 0.675, and a p-value of 0.006. I will be paying close attention to these three
relationships in the following regression tests.
Based on the correlation matrix, I again ran eight tests, following the same method as the
surge-and-decline model. The test that appears to be the representative of the referendum model
is the test in which the independent variables are PresApproval, PctChangInc, ConsumerConf,
and Party. This model has an adjusted R square value of 0.675, with a p-value of 0.003.
PresApproval has a coefficient value of 153.351, a standardized coefficient value of 0.608, and a
p-value of 0.004. PctChangInc has a coefficient value of 7.412, a standardized coefficient value
of 0.607, and a p-value of 0.030. ConsumerConf has a coefficient value of 0.120, a standardized
coefficient value of 0.070, and a p-value of 0.761. Finally, Party has a coefficient value of 21.114, a standardized coefficient value of -0.473, and a p-value of 0.029.
The results of this test, and the other seven tests revealed interesting information. First,
PresApproval is a very significant variable. In seven out of eight tests, PresApproval’s p-value
was below 0.05. Therefore, how the public perceive the job the president is doing will have an
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effect on the performance of his party in the midterm election. However, the president’s approval
rating is only one-half of the equation. There is still the matter of the economy. The tests also
show that when considering PctChangInc and PctChangInc3rd independently, the latter variable
is better variable to represent the economy than the former. However, when adding
ConsumerConf to the model, PctChangInc is now a better representative of the economy than
PctChangInc3rd. Speaking of ConsumerConf, although the variable’s p-value never reaches 0.05
or below, it is still an important variable when considering how the economy factors into
midterm elections. Therefore, when considering the percent change in total disposable income
per capita, the yearly annual change is a better variable to use than the third quarter annual
change.
Based on all of the results my presidential model will reflect the following:
Model #1 will incorporate HouseSeatGain only.
Model #2 will incorporate HouseSeatGain, PresVote, and Party.
Model #3 will incorporate HouseSeatGain, PresApproval, PctChangInc,
ConsumerConf, and Party.
Presidential Election Model
In order to incorporate the midterm theories into the presidential model accurately, I
made several changes to the midterm models. First, I lagged PresVote to represent the incumbent
president’s, share of the popular vote in the previous presidential election. Second, I lagged
HouseSeatGain to represent the incumbent party’s performance in the previous midterm election.
Third, PctChangInc now represents the change in total disposable income per capita from the
previous year. Fourth, and finally, ConsumerConf is the average of the values taken the year
prior to the presidential election. PresApproval is the only variable not lagged in any fashion.
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In the correlation matrix, the only relationship that has a significant correlation is the
relationship between PresReelect and PresApproval. For this relationship, the Pearson
correlation value was 0.619, and a p-value of 0.006. In regards to HouseSeatGain, the main
variable of concern for this model, the Pearson correlation value for HouseSeatGain and
PresReelect is -0.070, but its p-value is 0.777, well above the 0.05 statistical significance
thresholds.
After running all three tests of the model, including a number of variations of each test,
there were no tests where the variables reached statistical significance. The test in which
HouseSeatGain was the closest to statistical significance was a test that incorporated the
variables HouseSeatGain, PresApproval, PctChangInc, and ConsumerConf. In this test,
HouseSeatGain had a coefficient value of 0.030, an odds ratio of 1.031, and a p-value of 0.411.
PresApproval had a coefficient value of 12.405, an odds ratio of 244012.456, and a p-value of
0.336. PctChangInc had a coefficient value of 0.450, an odds ratio of 1.569, and a p-value of
0.580. Finally, ConsumerConf had a coefficient value of 0.011, an odds ratio of 1.011, and a pvalue of 0.896. In terms of the model as a whole, this model had a chi-square value of 9.361, and
a p-value of 0.053.
Based on the results of my presidential model, it appears as though the theories used to
predict midterm elections are not applicable to presidential elections. However, if these theories
are not applicable to predict presidential elections, then what factors need consideration when
predicting presidential elections?
Evaluating the Theories
Surge-and-Decline Theory
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The president’s share of the popular vote is the foundation of the surge-and-decline
theory. According to the results, no statistically significant relationship exists between the
president’s share of the popular vote, and the number of U.S. House seats his party will lose, or
gain, in the next midterm election. Compared with the referendum theory, surge-and-decline
holds a unique advantage. Whereas the referendum theory is limited in the number of elections
examined due to limited data availability, surge-and-decline is not limited. This allows me to
expand the period, and include cases prior to 1936. Thus, I ran another model similar to the one
ran earlier representing the surge-and-decline theory. The expectation is that if more cases are
included, then the results of this model will be an improvement over the model ran earlier. The
dependent variable is still HouseSeatGain, and the independent variables are PresVote and
Party; but this model includes midterm elections from 1862 to 1934. After running this model,
the results were as followed. First, the correlations between PresVote, Party, and
HouseSeatGain, were weaker than the correlations in the first model. In terms of the actual
equation, the adjusted R square value was -0.015, and its p-value was 0.487. PresVote had a
coefficient value of -81.750, a standardized coefficient value of -0.145, and a p-value of 0.391.
Party had a coefficient value of -9.700, a standardized coefficient value of -0.949, and a p-value
of 0.349.Compared with the earlier model, this model is a worse representative of surge-anddecline. Thus, surge-and-decline does not fit the overall trend of the president’s party losing
congressional seats in midterm elections.
The underlying principle behind the theory of surge and decline is that certain forces
present in a presidential election are absent in a midterm election, results in lower turnout and a
loss of congressional seats for the president’s party. However, I fail to see the reason as to why
the president’s share of the popular vote from his election is comparable to the number of seats
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his party gains or lose in the subsequent midterm election, a la James E. Campbell (1991).
Studying the relationship between presidential popular vote and midterm losses undertakes the
assumption that the president’s popular vote would be the same in the midterm election as it was
in the previous presidential election. This is not the case, however. Instead, the moving parts that
resulted in the president’s victory begin to shift again at about the same time the president takes
office and begins to make decisions. Because the president is on the ballot every four years, there
has to be a method in place to gauge the public’s attitude towards the president; thus explains the
role of the presidential approval poll, one of the underpinnings of the referendum theory.
Based on the results presented in this research, and taking into account the error of
evaluating the president’s popular vote, it is said with confidence the theory of surge-and-decline
is dead.
Referendum Theory
Although the period of the referendum theory is limited due to unavailability of data
regarding president’s approval rating and requisite economic data, it is still a better explainer
than the surge-and-decline theory as to why the president’s party loses congressional seats. The
president’s approval rating is, according to the data, the strongest variable available to predict
whether the president’s party will lose or gain seats.
There has been numerous literature published on the role of the economy in elections
(Kramer 1971; Stigler 1973; Tufte 1975, 814). On its own, the annual percent change of total
disposable income per capita, for the election year, is not a statistically significant variable.
However, when the consumer confidence index for the third quarter of the election year is
included, then the percent change variable becomes statistically significant. However, the pvalue for the variable representing consumer confidence never reaches the 0.05 threshold.
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However, the inclusion of this variable in the overall equation is necessary. This is because the
economy is considered as an intervening variable; it has an effect on both the president’s
approval rating and the results of the election. A figurative explanation of the role of the
economy in Tufte’s model is in the figure below:
Presidential
Approval

Midterm
Election

Figure 8
Economy
The role of the economy in Tufte’s referendum model is transposable onto elections in
general. The economy plays a role in both the midterm election and the presidential election.
Each one of these components is a leg in the “election triangle”:
Economy

Figure 9

Midterm
Elections

Presidential
Elections

Although the referendum cannot serve as the foundation of a presidential model that
incorporates midterm election results, it does not necessarily follow that the theory as a whole is
unable to serve as the foundation of a presidential model. This leads to an important question:
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what factors from the referendum theory, and possibly any outside factors, deserve consideration
when creating a presidential election model.
Presidential Model
For this presidential model, none of the variables included reached the appropriate levels
of statistical significance. Now it is time to turn attention to what factors need consideration
when predicting presidential elections. Based on the results from this research, the first factor to
consider when predicting presidential elections is the president’s approval rating. Located on the
next page is a graph displaying the probability an incumbent president, or the incumbent party,
has of retaining the White House, given a certain approval rating.
The graph measures the president’s approval rating in the last Gallup poll prior to the
election, against the average predicted probabilities of the president’s reelection chances. For
example, a president with an approval rating of 70 percent has, according to the graph, a 95%
chance of winning reelection. Contrarily, a president with an approval rating of 34 percent only
has a 12 percent chance of winning reelection. In the graph, the inflection point of the graph is
located between 45 and 51 percent. That means somewhere between these two percentages, the
incumbent president’s chances of reelection are 50 percent. This graph holds true to the idea that
presidents with an approval rating below 50 percent prior to Election Day will lose reelection.
This was the case for Gerald Ford, whose approval rating was 45 percent when he lost to Jimmy
Carter in 1976. Jimmy Carter’s approval rating was 37 percent going into the 1980 election,
when he lost to Ronald Reagan. George H.W. Bush lost to Bill Clinton in 1992 with a preElection Day approval rating of 34 percent. The only exception to this rule is Harry S. Truman in
1948, whose last recorded approval rating before the election was 39 percent.
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Graph 1

Another factor that deserves consideration deals with the issue(s) determining the
election. Sometimes, the most important issue is the economy; other times, foreign policy is the
top issue. For example, the 1968 presidential election the deciding issue was the Vietnam War.
The 2004 presidential election focused mainly on the War on Terrorism, especially in the last
days of campaigning with the release of a video recording of Osama bin Laden the weekend
before the election. Any presidential model needs to include an operationalization of this
variable.
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One other factor deserving attention is the off years of the presidential term. Elections
work in the following sequence:

Figure 10

Presidential
Election

Midterm
Election

Presidential
Election

If it is the case presidential elections are a referendum on the president’s term in office,
then voters will consider years three and four of the presidential term than years one and two. If a
presidential model incorporates this idea, the accuracy of the model will head in the correct
direction.
Conclusion
According to the results, it seems as though midterm elections have no bearing on
subsequent presidential elections. This is important because this means that Congress has no
coattails for the president to run on, or that the decisions, or lack of decisions, made by the
Congress have no direct effect on presidential elections. However, why is it the case Congress
has no coattails? Although Congress is composed of 535 unique individuals, it is also comprised
of two distinct political parties, the Democrats and the Republicans. The political fortunes of the
president, and the political fortunes of his fellow party members in Congress should be one-inthe same. The best indicator for this dynamic is Congress’s approval rating. However, only nine
presidential elections have a recorded Congressional approval rating. As time progresses, I am
confident researchers will be able to determine whether there is a relationship between
Congress’s approval, and the president’s reelection.
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Gary C. Jacobsen and Samuel Kernell said midterm elections provide an interesting
testing ground for theories regarding voting and elections in the United States (1983, 60). I am in
complete agreement with this statement. As political scientists continue to construct models to
predict presidential and midterm elections, it is my hope that any theory crafted will explain the
trends that make American politics unlike anything else in the world. For example, future studies
might take Tufte’s referendum model, substitute the president’s approval rating for Congress’s
approval rating, and instead of determining changes in the composition of the U.S. House of
Representatives, determine the reelection chances of the incumbent president and incumbent
party.
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Appendix A – Correlation Matrices
Midterm Election: Surge-and-Decline Theory

Pearson Correlation
HouseSeatGain

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Correlations
HouseSeatGain
Party
PresVote MagPresVote PartyIDD PartyIDR
1
-.376
-.390
-.400
-.016
.159
19

.112
19

.099
19

.090
19

.956
15

.570
15

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

-.376
.112

1

-.072
.768

-.063
.798

-.121
.667

-.007
.979

N
Pearson Correlation

19
-.390

19
-.072

19
1

19
.999**

15
.342

15
-.444

.099
19

.768
19

19

.000
19

.212
15

.098
15

Pearson Correlation
-.400
MagPresVote
Sig. (2-tailed)
.090
N
19
Pearson Correlation
-.016
PartyIDD
Sig. (2-tailed)
.956
N
15
Pearson Correlation
.159
PartyIDR
Sig. (2-tailed)
.570
N
15
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

-.063
.798
19
-.121
.667
15
-.007
.979
15

.999**
.000
19
.342
.212
15
-.444
.098
15

1

.346
.206
15
1

-.447
.095
15
-.674**
.006
15
1

Party

PresVote

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

19
.346
.206
15
-.447
.095
15

15
-.674**
.006
15

15
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Midterm Election: Referendum Theory

HouseSeatGain

Party

PresApproval

PctChangInc

PctChangInc3rd

ConsumerConf

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

HouseSeatGain
1
19

Correlations
Party
PresApproval PctChangInc PctChangInc3rd ConsumerConf
-.376
.506*
.288
.131
.478
.112
.027
.232
.629
.072
19
19
19
16
15

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

-.376
.112
19
.506*
.027
19
.288
.232

19
-.201
.410
19
.248
.307

N
Pearson Correlation

19
.131

19
.639**

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.629
16

.008
16

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

1

.248
.307
19
.284
.239
19
1

.639**
.008
16
-.276
.301
16
.969**
.000

.325
.238
15
.250
.369
15
.675**
.006

19
-.276

19
.969**

16
1

15
.710**

.301
16

.000
16

16

.003
15

**

-.201
.410
19
1
19
.284
.239

.478
.072

.325
.238

.250
.369

.675
.006

.710**
.003

1

15

15

15

15

15

15

N
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Presidential Model

Party
Party

1

Correlations
PresReelect HouseSeatGain PresVote PresApproval PctChangInc ConsumerConf
.045
-.365
.003
.075
.031
-.100
.855
.124
.991
.766
.904
.723
19
19
19
18
18
15

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

19

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

.045
.855
19
-.365
.124
19
.003
.991

19
-.070
.777
19
-.140
.567

19
-.459*
.048

N
Pearson Correlation

19
.075

19
.619**

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.766
18

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation

-.140
.567
19
-.459*
.048
19
1

.619**
.006
18
.063
.804
18
-.030
.905

.561*
.015
18
-.078
.759
18
.191
.448

.556*
.031
15
.223
.425
15
-.031
.913

19
.063

19
-.030

18
1

18
.680**

15
.704**

.006
18

.804
18

.905
18

18

.002
18

.003
15

.031
.904

*

.561
.015

-.078
.759

.191
.448

.680**
.002

1

.534*
.041

18
-.100

18
.556*

18
.223

18
-.031

18
.704**

18
.534*

15
1

Sig. (2-tailed)
.723
N
15
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

.031
15

.425
15

.913
15

.003
15

.041
15

15

PresReelect

HouseSeatGain

PresVote

PresApproval

PctChangInc

ConsumerConf

1

-.070
.777
19
1
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Appendix B – Surge-and-Decline Results
Model #1: Dependent Variable – HouseSeatGain, Independent Variables – PresVote and Party

Model

R
.563a

1

Model Summaryb
R Square
Adjusted R
Std. Error of
Square
the Estimate
.317
.231
20.857

DurbinWatson
2.328

a. Predictors: (Constant), PresVote, Party
b. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain

Model

1

Regression
Residual

Sum of
Squares
3225.734
6959.950

ANOVAa
df
Mean Square

Total
10185.684
a. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain
b. Predictors: (Constant), PresVote, Party

Model

2
16

1612.867
434.997

F
3.708

Residuals Statisticsa
Minimum Maximum
Mean Std. Deviation
Predicted Value
-54.07
-2.37
-29.74
13.387
Residual
-33.514
35.989
.000
19.664
Std. Predicted Value
-1.817
2.044
.000
1.000
Std. Residual
-1.607
1.726
.000
.943
a. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain

Sig.
.048b

18

Coefficientsa
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized
Coefficients

B
Std. Error
(Constant)
78.148
49.229
1
Party
-18.854
9.608
PresVote
-185.533
91.608
a. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain

t

Sig.

Beta
-.407
-.420

1.587
-1.962
-2.025

.132
.067
.060

N
19
19
19
19
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Model #2: Dependent Variable – HouseSeatGain, Independent Variables – MagPresVote and Party
Model Summaryb
Model
R
R Square
Adjusted R
Std. Error of
Square
the Estimate
a
1
.567
.322
.237
20.782
a. Predictors: (Constant), MagPresVote, Party

DurbinWatson
2.325

b. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain

Model

1

Regression
Residual

Sum of
Squares
3275.750
6909.934

ANOVAa
df
Mean Square
2
16

1637.875
431.871

F

Residuals Statisticsa
Minimum Maximum
Mean
Predicted Value
Residual

3.793

-29.74
.000

13.490
19.593

19
19

Std. Predicted Value
-1.822
2.035
Std. Residual
-1.625
1.727
a. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain

.000
.000

1.000
.943

19
19

.045b

Total
10185.684
18
a. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain
b. Predictors: (Constant), MagPresVote, Party

Model

Coefficientsa
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized
Coefficients

B
Std. Error
(Constant)
-14.717
7.484
1
Party
-18.688
9.567
MagPresVote
-188.345
91.390
a. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain

t

Sig.

Beta
-.403
-.425

-1.966
-1.953
-2.061

N

-2.29
35.898

Sig.

.067
.069
.056

-54.31
-33.780

Std. Deviation
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Appendix C – Referendum Results
Model Summaryb
Model
R
R Square
Adjusted R
Std. Error of
DurbinSquare
the Estimate
Watson
a
1
.876
.768
.675
12.900
2.440
a. Predictors: (Constant), ConsumerConf, PresApproval, Party, PctChangInc
b. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain

ANOVAa
df
Mean Square

Model

Sum of
F
Squares
Regression
5509.242
4
1377.310
8.277
1
Residual
1664.091
10
166.409
Total
7173.333
14
a. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain
b. Predictors: (Constant), ConsumerConf, PresApproval, Party, PctChangInc

Coefficientsa
Unstandardized Coefficients

Model

B
-120.888
-21.114
153.351
7.412

32.610
8.309
41.937
2.938

ConsumerConf
.120
a. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain

.385

1

(Constant)
Party
PresApproval
PctChangInc

Std. Error

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

Residuals Statisticsa
Minimum Maximum
Mean Std. Deviation
Predicted Value
-55.24
10.57
-24.33
19.837
Residual
-15.568
17.844
.000
10.902
Std. Predicted Value
-1.558
1.759
.000
1.000
Std. Residual
-1.207
1.383
a. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain

Sig.
.003b

t

Sig.

-.473
.608
.607

-3.707
-2.541
3.657
2.522

.004
.029
.004
.030

.070

.313

.761

.000

.845

N
15
15
15
15
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Appendix D – Presidential Model Results
Model #1: Presidential Model including Surge-and-Decline

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
df
Sig.
Step 1

Step

Step
Block

.856
.856

3
3

.836
.836

Model

.856

3

.836

1

Model Summary
-2 Log
Cox & Snell R Nagelkerke R
likelihood
Square
Square
a
25.008
.044
.059

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Classification Tablea
Observed

0
Step 1
1
Overall Percentage
a. The cut value is .500
PresReelect

HouseSeatGain

Predicted
PresReelect
Percentage
Correct
0
1
2
6
25.0
1
10
90.9
63.2

Variables in the Equation
B
S.E.
Wald
-.018
.027
.425

df
1

Party
-.085
1.029
.007
1
PresVote
-8.972
10.832
.686
1
Constant
4.641
5.530
.705
1
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: HouseSeatGain, Party, and PresVote.
Step 1a

Sig.
.514

Exp(B)
.982

.935
.408
.401

.919
.000
103.699
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Model #2: Presidential Model including Referendum Theory

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
df
Sig.
Step
11.460
5
.043
Step 1 Block
11.460
5
.043
Model

11.460

5

Model Summary
Step
-2 Log
Cox & Snell R Nagelkerke R
likelihood
Square
Square
a
1
9.268
.534
.713
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 9 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

.043

Classification Tablea
Observed

Predicted
PresReelect
Percentage
Correct
0
1

0
Step 1
1
Overall Percentage
a. The cut value is .500

6
1

PresReelect

HouseSeatGain

Step 1a

Party
PresApproval
PctChangInc
ConsumerConf

2
6

Variables in the Equation
B
S.E.
Wald
-.034
.071
.230
-3.100
17.067
.672
.252

3.598
15.671
.880
.325

.742
1.186
.583
.604

75.0
85.7
80.0

df
1
1
1
1
1

Sig.
.631

Exp(B)
.967

.389
.045
.276 25816178.787
.445
1.957
.437
1.287

Constant
-36.224
40.374
.805
1
.370
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: HouseSeatGain, Party, PresApproval, PctChangInc, and
ConsumerConf.

.000
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